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Abstract: Transformation in the eastern part of Europe began following the “velvet” rev-
olution and continued after the “colour” revolutions. These two types of transformative 
revolution have many things in common, first of all a form of mass protest combining 
democracy and nationalism at its roots. However, nationalism did not begin to appear 
immediately after the fall of communism but rather after the first halting and unsuccessful 
democratic changes. In other words, nationalists did not take over from communists, but 
from democrats.
Keywords: nationalism, democracy, transformative revolutions
The prominent Polish dissident and later influential public figure Adam Mi-chnik described nationalism as the final stage of communism. These fa-
mous words are usually interpreted in the sense that communist regimes in the 
former socialist countries are first replaced by nationalism, an ideology that is 
cruder and easier to understand by the masses, and then by democracy, a much 
more complex system to comprehend and implement. Admittedly, the opposite 
is also known to happen. Authoritarian communist leaders employ nationalism 
as the last means of staying in power and preventing major changes. The most 
striking example of this is Milošević’s Serbia. In both cases, however, national-
ism is an obstacle to democratic change. 
Unlike these widespread conclusions, some researchers see a positive as-
pect in the rise of nationalism during the collapse of communist regimes. They 
believe that nationalism acted as a sort of catalyst of change in Eastern European 
countries and as the only force capable of uniting and mobilizing the masses in 
the struggle against institutions of totalitarianism. Having resolved this prob-
lem, a nationalist coalition inevitably crumbles and its factions appear as politi-
cal rivals, leading to a functional pluralistic society.1
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Let me attempt a more in-depth exploration of these problems. As we 
know, the process of abandoning the socialist path in Eastern European coun-
tries took the form of so-called “velvet revolutions” of 1989. 
The forms of these “revolutions” could be very different – peaceful pro-
tests as well as revolts that included violence or round tables of the leading po-
litical forces or the organization of the first multiparty elections after a longer 
hiatus.2 The period of “velvet revolutions” in Eastern Europe lasted ten years 
and essentially came to its end with the “October” or “Bulldozer” revolution in 
Serbia in 2000.
This revolution was of a twofold nature. On the one hand, it was the last 
in the series of “velvet revolutions” that had begun in 1989; on the other hand, 
it opened a series of new revolutions known as “colour revolutions”. This was 
in fact a re-edition of “velvet revolutions” in countries where the implemented 
changes proved insufficient and incomplete, failing to achieve the objectives of 
previous revolutions. The aim of these new “colour revolutions” is to put an end 
to the corruption and bureaucratic arbitrariness of the new regime, as well as 
to social insecurity, gaping stratification, and the astronomical profits of ruling 
clans often built on familial relations.3
A characteristic of the “coloured revolutions” of the early twenty-first cen-
tury is that they usually took place in periods of election – hence they are also 
known as “electoral revolutions”. At the end of the twentieth century, multiparty 
elections were the main device of the opposition’s struggle for their electoral win 
and the mechanism of regime change in many Eastern European countries. An 
attempt to challenge or even neutralize these electoral victories has often proved 
the last straw.
In other words, “colour revolutions” of the early twenty-first century were 
meant to finish what the “velvet revolutions” had left unfinished. This is precisely 
the reason that new revolutions tend to occur in relatively underdeveloped coun-
tries – in the Balkans and in the former USSR. Secondly, “colour revolutions” are 
focused on resolving the contrasts that emerged already during the post-socialist 
transformation; they “achieved a stable character and began to exert moderate 
influence on further development”.4
2 See, e.g., Istoriia antikomunisticheskih revolutsii kontsa XX veka. Tsentral’nia i Iugo-Vostoch-
naia Evropa (Moscow: Nauka, 2007); Revoliutsii i reform v stranah Tsentral’noi i Iugo-Vostoch-
noi Evropy: 20 let spustia (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2011); Konets epokhi. SSSR i revoliutsii v 
stranah Vostochnoi Evropy 1989–1991 gg. Dokumenty (Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2015).
3 V. Inozemtsev, “Trudnyi vozrast elity. Novye ‘narodnnye revoliutsii’ kardinal’no otlichaiut-
sia ot sobytii, imevshikh mesto shestnadtsat’ let nazad”, Nezavisimaia gazeta , 6 April 2005. 
4 A. Riabov, “Moskva prinimaet vyzov ‘tsvetnykh’ revoliutsii”, Pro et contra ( July–August 
2005), 19–20.
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Hence, in my view, both the first and the second revolution are phenom-
ena of the same type and should be regarded as a single process. They can col-
lectively be termed “transformative revolutions”.5
One revolutionary shift, it should be understood, is often insufficient to 
achieve a full transition to a new democratic system, particularly in underdevel-
oped countries. And although one revolutionary impulse was enough for Cen-
tral European states such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, 
for Serbia and some post-Soviet countries new revolutionary upsurges proved 
necessary.
For example, in Russia, to facilitate the beginning of real transforma-
tion two revolutionary shifts were needed: firstly, the August Coup of 1991, the 
suppression of which put an end to the Communist monopoly on power; and 
secondly the events of October 1993, which ended the Soviet organization of 
power. In Ukraine, the “velvet revolution” did not make much of an impact, but 
it was immediately followed by two “colour” uprisings: the Orange Revolution of 
2004 and the so-called Euromaidan of 2013–2014.
Again, this is hardly unusual. Let us remember that in many Western 
European countries a whole series of revolutions was needed to fully establish 
the bourgeois system. The most illustrative, textbook example is provided by 
French history.
Let me note once again that the two types of transformative revolutions 
highlighted here – “velvet” and “colour” – have a lot in common: above all mass 
protests with a combination of democracy and nationalism at their roots. We 
need to understand how this works.
Firstly, nationalism does not seem to emerge immediately after the demise 
of communism, as might perhaps be understood from Michnik’s above-quoted 
formula; rather, it seems to appear after the first – uncertain and unsuccessful 
– democratic changes. More specifically, the nationalists did not take over from 
the communists, but from the democrats. Secondly, shifts such as these occurred 
not only during the most recent transformative turnarounds or immediately af-
ter them, but also a long time before any “velvet” or “colour” revolutions.
Let me mention just two examples from the history of Yugoslavia, begin-
ning with the events in Croatia in the early 1970s. During a discussion on con-
stitutional amendments, there emerged in Croatia the so-called MASPOK (an 
abbreviation of masovni pokret [mass movement]), also known as the Croatian 
Spring to analogize the Prague Spring.
5 There is still no established name for these revolutions. The terms “velvet” and “colour” have 
little actual meaning. They are sometimes defined by negation, for example as “anti-commu-
nist”. But where these revolutions lead and what their purpose is remains unclear from these 
terms.
Balcanica L (2019)430
Protests and rallies took place throughout the republic. It all began with 
the question of the Croatian language and culture and ended in the glorification 
of the fascist Independent State of Croatia and accusations of unitarism against 
the federation and of “Great Serbdom” against the Serbs. There were demands 
to immediately re-evaluate foreign trade and the monetary and banking system 
of Yugoslavia in favour of Croatia. Serbs living in Croatia began to be discrimi-
nated against in daily life, employment etc.
The nationalist forces rallied around Matica Hrvatska (Matrix Croati-
ca) – the leading cultural and educational republic-level institution, as well as 
around the University of Zagreb. The movement was headed by the leadership 
of the League of Communists of Croatia: S. Dabčević-Kučar, M. Tripalo, and P. 
Pirker. F. Tudjman, who would go on to become the first president of indepen-
dent Croatia, actively participated in MASPOK. Tito took his time, made no 
moves for a while, and then finally came out and said that he had been deceived. 
The Croatian nationalists had indeed glorified him in the press as a “Croat” and 
organized opulent receptions for him. However, as MASPOK began to ac-
quire increasingly nationalist overtones and get out of hand, Tito intervened in 
December 1971, arresting the movement’s leaders and removing the Croatian 
leadership.6
All of this is well known. But here it is important to underline that the 
initial democratism of the Croatian movement rather quickly took on a nation-
alist and anti-state character.7
Another example is provided by Serbia, which after Tito’s death under-
went processes that were in many respects reminiscent of the Soviet Perestroika. 
The catalyst for the activities of Serbian opposition intellectuals was the regime’s 
ban of Gojko Djogo’s poetry book Vunena vremena [Woollen Times] in April 
1981. The poet had targeted Tito himself in his poems. Djogo’s subsequent ar-
rest led to a wave of protests of the Serbian intelligentsia; group letters were 
written and “solidarity evenings” organized in his defence. These initiatives grew 
6 For more detail see B. Petranović, Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–1978 (Belgrade: Nolit, 1981), 
580–582; Tsentral’no-Vostochnaia Evropa vo vtoroi polovine XX veka, in 3 vols. (Moscow: 
Nauka, 2002), vol. 2, 495–496; I. Goldstein, Hrvatska 1918–2000 (Zagreb: Znanje, 2008), 
532–552. See also I. V. Rudneva, Khorvatskoe national’noe dvidzenie: konets 1960/kh – nachalo 
1970/kx gg. (Moscow: Institut slavianovedeniia RAN; St. Petersburg: Nestor, 2014).
7 Goldstein, Hrvatska, 538, writes that “two main ideas were dominant in the movement – 
the national and the liberal-democratic idea. In some participants and in some circumstances 
one or the other was more prominent, but usually it was an amalgamation of both with a 
dominant national component”. However, it should be noted that democratization in Croatia 
primarily meant the expansion of the autonomous rights of the Croatian people. This was 
another difference between Croatia and Serbia, where it primarily meant the democratiza-
tion of political life, see Z. Radelić, Hrvatska u Jugoslaviji 1945–1991: Od zajedništva do razlaza 
(Zagreb; Školska knjiga; Hrvatski institut za povijest, 2006), 379–380.
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into a protest against the economic situation, political and constitutional system, 
the lack of political freedoms and freedom of the press etc. In May 1982 the 
Association of Writers of Serbia formed the Committee for the Protection of 
Artistic Production, which quickly became the symbol of the democratic protest 
against the regime.8
Many scholars of a range of humanities, primarily those who had pre-
viously worked with the famous Yugoslav magazine Praxis (in publication 
1964–1975), took part in the criticism of the regime and the entire communist 
past and present. Serbs were once again the most active: philosophers Ljubomir 
Tadić and Mihailo Marković; economist Kosta Mihajlović; legal scholars Vo-
jislav Koštunica and Kosta Čavoški. The last two co-wrote the book Partijski plu-
ralizam ili monizam [Party Pluralism or Monism], which denied the legitimacy 
of the communists’ rise to power in Yugoslavia and their implementation of a 
one-party system. In this period a special role was played by the book Saveznici 
i jugoslovenska ratna drama [The Allies and the Yugoslav War Drama] by the 
Serbian historian Veselin Djuretić, which portrayed the Četnik movement as an 
anti-fascist force for the first time in academic literature.9
The main myths of socialist Yugoslavia gradually began to crumble. The 
Partisans were no longer seen as the only anti-fascist movement of the war years 
and Yugoslavia itself was no longer seen as a country that had built a very differ-
ent and more progressive type of socialism. It was revealed that the revolution 
in Yugoslavia had been carried out following the Bolshevik model and that even 
after 1948 local Stalinists – genuine or alleged – had been treated by Stalinist 
methods. A little while later, the author A. Isaković demanded a re-evaluation 
of Tito’s personal cult, just as it had been done after Stalin’s or Mao’s death; Lj. 
Tadić argued that, denying the dogma of the infallibility of Stalin as their former 
supreme authority, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia had not rejected 
these dogmas but had merely nationalized them.10
The regime cannot be said to have been completely inactive. It tried to 
stop these emerging processes using its usual methods. In April 1982, twenty-
eight Serbian intellectuals were arrested, with six of them later tried in court. 
However, like Djogo, almost all were soon released.
The Belgrade intelligentsia advocated human rights, not only in Serbia 
but throughout Yugoslavia. The centre of these activities was the Committee 
for the Defence of Freedom of Thought and Expression led by the eminent au-
thor Dobrica Ćosić. Representatives of the Slovene and Croatian intelligentsia 
8 D. Jović, Jugoslavija: država koja je odumrla. Uspon, kriza i pad Kardeljeve Yugoslavije (1974–
1990) (Zagreb: Prometej, 2003), 336–337.
9 D. Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest (Zagreb: Golden marketing, 1999), 698–700; To-
mas, Srbija pod Miloševićem, 56–57.
10 Bilandžić, Hrvatska moderna povijest, 698–699.
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refused to join the Committee despite being expressly invited. Regardless of 
this, the Committee voiced its protest against the arrest of Alija Izetbegović and 
other Bosnian Muslims in Sarajevo and demanded the release of Vlado Gotovac 
and other MASPOK members incarcerated in Croatia. The Committee also 
defended the Kosovo Albanians convicted after the developments of 1981. In 
the period 1984–1989 the Committee sent out over a hundred letters protesting 
against the violation of basic democratic rights in Yugoslavia.11
Immediately following the events that unfolded in Kosovo, the Serbian 
authorities once again tried to broach the question of constitutional changes.12 
However, Serbia’s opponents in the Yugoslav leadership from other republics 
saw every such attempt as a return to etatism, centralism and aspirations to a 
“Great Serbia”. Any constitutional changes were blocked. However, it was pre-
cisely the “political system established by the Constitution of 1974 that deep-
ened the ongoing crisis and made it more serious and hopeless”.13
The lack of a legal mechanism to resolve the problem of the Constitution 
of 1974 could not but result in the gradual radicalization of the mood among the 
Serbs. The old conflict in the Central Committee of the League of Communists 
of Serbia between the “liberals” spearheaded by I. Stambolić and the proponents 
of a radical solution for existing quarrels also intensified.
Then, in 1984, Slobodan Milošević – the main protagonist of Serbian 
history in the 1990s – appeared on the political scene of Serbia. The “liberals” 
in the ranks of the Serbian communists were defeated and a few years later 
the “radicals” made Milošević the leader of the party. The Serbian historian Lj. 
Dimić believes that at the time when the totalitarian model – including ideo-
logical utopianism and unlimited power of the party elite with its charismatic 
leaders – began to lose momentum in Europe, it began to solidify in Serbia, 
previously the most liberal among the Yugoslav republics.14
It could be said that the regime in Serbia – after already having collapsed 
in Eastern Europe – underwent a revival and was fundamentally re-established 
with Slobodan Milošević’s rise to power. Interestingly, the “party that had ruled 
for 40 years, now governed through a new, ‘purified’ (to borrow the term used 
at the time) leadership, becoming both the government and the opposition at 
11 Ibid. 698–699.
12 Ibid. 339.
13 Attempts to reconsider the Constitution were launched by Serbia in 1975, 1981, 1984 
and 1985. See, e.g., Lj. Dimić, “Srbija 1804–2004 (suočavanje sa prošlošću), in Lj. Dimić, 
D. Stojanović and M. Jovanović, Srbija 1804–2004: tri vidjenja ili poziv na dijalog (Belgrade: 
Udruženje za društvenu istoriju, 2005), 102.
14  Ibid. 100.
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once”.15 It was precisely the fact that Milošević managed to “ride” this wave of 
nationalism that lent such stability to the regime.16
In late 1988, with the help of protests against the local bureaucracy which 
he had conisderably inspired, Milošević managed to replace the leadership of 
Vojvodina and Montenegro with his own protégés. Similar attempts were made 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina, but with little success. These shifts were called “anti-
bureaucratic revolutions”. Of course, they had little to do with the “velvet revolu-
tions” that swept Eastern Europe in 1989. As communism counted its last days 
throughout Eastern Europe, the old regime in Serbia, under the slogan of an 
“anti-bureaucratic revolution”, managed to consolidate its power.
The boom of nationalism in Serbia, spearheaded by Milošević, was also 
boosted by the concurrent rise of nationalism in Yugoslavia’s north-western re-
publics – Slovenia17 and Croatia. This was followed by the rapid deterioration 
of the Yugoslav economy and, even more importantly, by the events in Kosovo, 
where the position of the local Serbian population was becoming increasingly 
difficult. In order to attract attention, the Serbs of Kosovo began sending collec-
tive petitions to the higher government organs and organizing protest marches 
to Belgrade.
In the context of this topic, it is important to note that the developments 
in Kosovo had a decisive impact on the fact that the Yugoslav democratism of 
the Serbian opposition intelligentsia increasingly gave way to nationalist ideas. 
While many pro-opposition figures, including Dobrica Ćosić, had previously 
believed that the Yugoslav federation was the best solution for the Serbian ques-
tion, they now began to see it as a suppression mechanism directed at all things 
Serbian.18 The pattern observed above came to the fore – the replacement of 
initially democratic tendencies by national or even nationalist ones.
A similar pattern can be observed in the territory of the former USSR. 
For example, in many Soviet republics, particularly in the Baltic states, popular 
15 D. Stoianovich, “Porochnyi krug serbskoi oppozitsii”, in Serbiia o sebe (Moscow: Evropa, 
2005), 117. For more detail see Jović, Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla, 423, 430, 449.
16 The words of Slobodan Jovanović used to describe an earlier period in Serbian history 
come to mind and seem as current as ever: “Serbia did not create an intellectual and political 
elite with a modern understanding of nation. The semi-intellectual became prevalent, leech-
ing on nationalism as the only tradition, even when it was no longer so.” Quoted in L. Perović, 
“Iskustvo sa drugim narodima”, in Jugoslavija u istorijskoj perspektivi (Belgrade: Helsinški od-
bor za ljudska prava u Srbiji, 2017), 207. 
17 According to Jović, Jugoslavija, država koja je odumrla, 423, 430, 449, Slovene nationalism 
was no weaker than Serbian. Like in Serbia, the Slovene leadership was becoming increas-
ingly tolerant towards its opposition and in the end a pan-Slovene bloc of sorts emerged in 
this republic. Like in Serbia, the Slovene communists could become both the government 
and the opposition.
18 S. K. Pavlović, Srbija: istorija iza imena (Belgrade: Clio, 2004), 218, 227.
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fronts were organized as informal coalitions of very diverse forces opposed to 
the monopolist position of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). 
Generally speaking, they were led by democratic convictions and enjoyed the 
support of both the titular and the Russian-speaking population. However, in 
time, and particularly after coming to power, these organizations or political par-
ties and the coalitions that had emerged from them took up extremely national 
or even nationalist positions. For example, it is well known that many Russians 
and native speakers of Russian in Latvia and Estonia, even those born in these 
states, did not receive Latvian or Estonian citizenship.
At a very different time, in the period 2011–2013, very different events 
took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow. Mass protests were held against the 
alleged falsification of the results of parliamentary and then presidential elec-
tions. For the purposes of this paper it is important to note that nationalist 
forces gradually began to emerge and become prominent in the joint democratic 
movement of protesting citizens. Although certainly in the minority, these forces 
were far more united and better organized than the others. It can be assumed 
that they could have completely taken over the initiative if the government had 
not quelled the protests. 
Finally, another example is the abovementioned Ukrainian Euromaidan 
– the political crisis that erupted in the country in 2013–2014. The protests 
began with democratic demands and were aimed against social injustice, the low 
standard of living, rampant corruption etc. only to quickly radicalize, with the 
leading role taken over by nationalist and even extreme nationalist forces that 
glorified Nazi fascist collaborators in the Second World War.
Let me underline once again: nationalism, as we have seen, tends to enter 
the stage in times of democratic changes, while democratic ideas are clearing 
their path but still remain underdeveloped and have yet to win the final victory 
and become deeply embedded. In this case nationalism makes use of new pos-
sibilities that have emerged, among other things, owing to democratization pro-
cesses. I am of the opinion that this is one of the obvious patterns of democratic 
transformations, which always bring a very real danger of the rise of national-
ism. Encouraging nationalism in the name of the struggle against totalitarian 
or authoritarian regimes always means playing with fire. Nationalism will not 
necessarily yield the positions it has won to democracy. 
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